T he price will prevent many who should from owning it. It will also reduce instructional use, where the book could serve well as the focus of a special graduate seminar or as a valuable adjunct to graduate courses in the disciplines represented by the contributors.
Excluding content, you get an ade quate but unexceptional cover and, as the result of desktop publishing, you get oc casionally annoying margin justification and some mismatches in reference spac ing (Deacon's two contributions to the book versus the others). On the other hand, you get a more current book (mid 1987) than the July 1986 NATO Ad vanced Study Institute where it origi nated and you get a BITNET address with an invitation ". . . to communicate (gentle messages) to the editors. . ." (p. viii)! Regarding content, you get plenty. The 24 generally excellent contributions range from anatomy to zoology (includ ing anthropology, biology, computer sci ence, linguistics, neuroscience, philoso phy, and psychology) and range from the philosophical to new methodological ar guments and data. Each contribution in forms and provokes.
jerison's (Harry, in all uses of the sin gular) " . . . plan was to emphasize, in order, evolutionary biology, neurobiol-' ogy, analytic issues (philosophy and ar-' tificial intelligence) and, finally, behav ioral data from ethology and psychology"; (p. 447). However, this order was not achieved, perhaps because some authors' contributions deviated from the expected (see comments on 'pp. 448-449). I read it straight through, except for an early reading of the last chapter (jerison's ". '.. Afterthoughts"), and found myself both enjoying the sequential diversity and wishing for tighter organization. It is not feasible to reflect all contributions, but a prospective reader will find a useful synopsis of most in jerison's "Reprise" (p.447).
The noisy ghost is "intelligence." The contributors do not agree on a definition or a means to assess it. Several contrib utors address intelligence primarily by implication. For example, anatomical and other aspects of language dominate sev eral contributions (e.g., Leiberman, Levy, Schusterman, & Cisiner, Deacon's first chapter, and Herman in jerison's last chapter).
Before returning to the poltergeist, a few points about the papers that empha size language are in order. First, both Leiberrnan and Levy perpetuate the er ror that Broca "discovered" the relation between the left anterior cerebrum and speech. Credit should have gone to Bouillaud and Aubertin (Stookey, 1954) , whom Broca (1861 Broca ( /1960 himself rec ognized. Second, Levy and Deacon em phasize the importance of "conditional discrimination" in conjunction with as sessing possible evolutionary prerequi sites for language. Levy suggests that conditional discrimination ". . . may well represent a preadaptation of the simian brain for the evolution of human propositional reasoning in the left hemi sphere" (p. 164), and Deacon considers it "most significant" in the selection for "symbolic communication" (p. 408). Two cautions must be noted: (a) The data (Dewson's in Levy's case and Petrides's in Deacon's case) supporting these as sertions are questionable in terms of rote versus conceptual learning (see Thomas & Noble, 1988 , for related discussion). (b) The relationship between the tasks used and a formal analysis of the propo sitional logic ofthe conditional is tenuous.
Aside from these objections, Levy's refutation of Cazzaniga's assertion that the disconnected human right hemi sphere is". . . vastly inferior to the cog nitive skills of the chimpanzee" (p. 159) is beautifully done, and Deacon's empir ical data and methodological arguments are compelling (his "part/whole prob lem" discussion on pp. 386-394 surely made some contributors squirm). Lei berman's analysis of the implications of the evolution of the human suprapha ryngeal vocal tract for the evolution of language and related cognitive abilities deserves careful consideration. Schu sterman and Cisiner show the need for, and the way to, rigor in animal language research and criticize Herman soundly for his use of biasing terminology. Her man's rebuttal (included in jertson's last chapter) is effective, but the fact remains that he uses prejudicial terms.
"Intelligence," for several partici pants, is identified with equally prob lematic conceptualizations. Jerison (p. 7) and Thompson (p. 38) equate intelligence with the equally elusive "cognition" (see Flavell, 1977, p. 1) , and Csanyi's "goal directed behavior" (p. 300), Reed's (p. 429) and Hofman's (p. 438) "problem solving capacity," and Vossen's "infor mation processing capability" (p. 422) are no better. Hodos (see pp. 100-101) and Fasolo and Malacarne (see p. 119) adopt multiprocess views (not that cog nition, problem solving, etc. are not). Bitterman and Plotkin are comfortable with learning abilities as strong compo nents of intelligence, but Jerison and Poli present strong antilearning positions. Poli's concerns about confounding con textual cues (e.g., species differences in sensory and motor capacities and in mo tivation) can be logically "neutralized," but space limits preclude discussion of this here.
Plotkin's "Hierarchy of Processes for Gaining Knowledge" (p. 77) is the best approach to the conceptualization of in telligence. It is sufficiently general to en compass all conceivable ways for an or ganism to gain knowledge. Its four levels ". . . are the genetic, the developmen tal, the individual learner, and the socio cultural" (p. 77). It is hierarchical be cause lower levels are prerequisite to, and inseparable from, higher levels. Its principal weakness is lack of precision at the individual learner level where most assessments of intelligence will occur, but a more precise hierarchy of learning types that can be substituted for Plotkin's examples is available (Thomas, 1980) . Conceptualizations such as "cognition" and "problem solving" can arguably be reduced to the types of learning in the aforementioned hierarchy.
This review cannot end without a mention of the wealth of data provided by Kruska on the effects of domestication on the brains of animals (their brains and, especially, limbic structures are generally smaller) and his insightful views on the behavioral correlates thereof. Harvey's and Deacon's chapters will interest the brain "allometrists," as will Jerison' s re action to Harvey. Jerison also "debates" with Hodos on brain-intelligence rela tions. Deary nicely informs about "in spection time" (a form of reaction time), which correlates highly with psychomet ric measures of human intelligence and which has promise in phylogenetic com parisons. Thompson's examination of the "Received View" of theory (rooted in logical positivism and deemed "bad") versus the "semantic conception of the ory construction" ("good") ". . . for re lating evolutionary theory to human be havior" (p. 36) and Ruse's philosophical and Boden's AI perspectives deserve consideration. Lipp's, Pickford's, and Csanyi's theses are interesting and com pelling. There is more to say but no more space, so, like the [erisons, I offer my BITNEr address, RKTHOMAS@UCA.
